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ABSTRACT 
Criminology is widely accepted to be an interdisciplinary subject. However, evolutionary 
approaches are conspicuous by their absence in mainstream criminological contexts. 
Although the reasons for this theoretical lacuna are no doubt varied, we argue that the 
time is apposite for a measured consideration of the role of evolutionary explanations in 
criminology. By drawing on the idea of vertical integration and through recognition of 
how different theories are typically pitched at different levels of analysis we describe how 
evolutionary approaches might be integrated with mainstream criminological theories. 
The integration of evolutionary approaches with strain, control, and developmental 
approaches are given specific consideration. We illustrate how this integrated 
perspective can inform our understanding of one substantive area in criminology, the 
nature of punishment. We conclude that the growing literature in evolutionary forensic 
psychology and recent developments in the application of evolutionary theory to human 
behavior provide a valuable opportunity for criminologists to broaden their theoretical 
horizons and more fully consider how evolutionary approaches may contribute to their 
discipline.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Criminology is widely accepted to be an interdisciplinary subject (e.g., Newburn, 2007). 
Because it focuses on a specific topic, or set of topics – crime and responses to crime – 
rather than being located within a particular domain of inquiry (like psychology, 
sociology, or political science), criminologists inevitably draw on a diverse range of 
academic disciplines in the development of criminological theory. However, without 
denying McLaughlin and Newburn’s (2010a, p. 2) assertion that criminology is “a field of 
inquiry where people from a variety of intellectual and scholarly backgrounds come 
together to engage in research and deliberation” the theoretical endeavors of 
criminologists have been heavily dominated by sociological approaches. Although others 
have noted the relative neglect of psychological theories (e.g., McGuire, 2004; Weber, 
2010) and biological factors (e.g., Walsh, 2009a; Wright & Boisvert, 2009), we want to 
draw attention in this article to the almost complete absence of evolutionary approaches 
within criminological theory. Although there are a few notable exceptions (e.g., 
Brannagin, 1997; Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Walsh, 2006; Walsh, 2009a) evolutionary 
approaches are conspicuous by their absence in mainstream criminological contexts. For 
instance, in an analysis of 19 introductory criminology textbooks published after 2000, 
less than half made any reference to evolution, evolutionary theory, or evolutionary 
psychology (Durrant, 2010). This neglect is exemplified in a recent, cutting-edge 500 
page survey of criminological theory (McLaughlin & Newburn, 2010b), including 13 
chapters devoted to “new approaches”, in which there is no indexed reference to any 
evolutionary approaches at all. Although the reasons for this theoretical lacuna are no 
doubt varied and, reasonably enough, reflect the sociological training of most 
criminologists (Walsh & Ellis, 2004) we argue that there are at least four good reasons 
why the time is apposite for a measured consideration of the role of evolutionary 
explanations in criminology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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  First, evolutionary approaches have become, to a significant extent, incorporated 
within mainstream psychological science. This is illustrated in the plethora of textbooks 
devoted to evolutionary psychology, the growing representation of evolutionary ideas in 
introductory psychology textbooks (e.g., Cornwell, Palmer, Guinther & Davis, 2005) and 
the rapid growth in research publications that draw on evolutionary ideas (Durrant & Ellis, 
in press). In short, although evolutionary psychology has not quite revolutionized 
psychology in the manner envisioned by Buss (1995), and there remains a healthy 
critical literature on evolutionary approaches in the behavioral sciences (e.g., Buller, 
1995; Lloyd, 1999), there is also a rich body of general theory and empirical research 
that can be drawn upon by criminologists. Second, despite their absence from 
mainstream criminological contexts, evolutionary approaches have been fruitfully 
employed to explain a diverse range of criminological phenomena: from aggression, 
violence and homicide (Archer, 2009; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Duntley & Buss, 2011; Sell, 
2011), to theft (Kanazawa, 2008), drug use (Durrant, Adamson, Todd & Sellman, 2009) 
punishment (Peterson, Sell, Tooby & Cosmides, 2010), and rehabilitation (Ward & 
Durrant, 2011a).  In other words, alongside a substantive body of general theoretical 
and empirical research there is also a rich research literature on evolutionary approaches 
to crime and antisocial behavior that can be exploited. Third, there is also a growing 
recognition that a pluralistic approach to applying evolutionary theory to the behavioral 
and social sciences – one that recognizes the importance of human behavioral diversity 
and cultural processes – provides the most appropriate framework for advancing our 
understanding of the evolutionary underpinnings of human behavior (Brown, Dickins, 
Sear & Laland, 2011; Dunbar, 2006; Durrant & Ward, 2011; Gangestad & Simpson, 
2007; Ward & Durrant, 2011b). This, more pluralistic perspective, we suggest, may 
afford better opportunities for integration with mainstream criminological approaches.  
Finally, although as Barak (2010) notes, “integrative criminology” is not a new 
development and may mean different things to different people, there appears to be a 
growing recognition of the importance of integrated theories of crime and punishment 
that meaningfully  incorporate biological, psychological, and sociological variables (e.g., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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Agnew, 2005; Barak, 2010; Muftic, 2009; Walsh, 2009a). A consideration of our 
evolutionary history, we suggest, should form part of these integrative efforts. 
  Our aim in this paper, then, is to clarify the role of evolutionary explanations in 
criminology with a focus on how evolutionary approaches can be best integrated with 
mainstream criminological approaches. We first provide a brief outline of what can be 
termed Evolutionary Behavioral Science – an integrative perspective that encompasses 
the main approaches to applying evolutionary theory to human behavior (see Brown et 
al., 2010; Ward & Durrant, 2011b). We then explicitly discuss the role of evolutionary 
explanations in criminology. By drawing on the idea of vertical integration and through 
recognition of how different theories are typically pitched at different levels of analysis 
we describe how evolutionary approaches might be integrated with mainstream 
criminological theories. The integration of evolutionary approaches with strain, control, 
and developmental approaches are given specific consideration. We then illustrate how 
this integrated perspective can inform our understanding of a substantive area in 
criminology, the nature of punishment.  Although we do not endorse the idea that the 
incorporation of evolutionary approaches will effect a revolution in criminological theory, 
we do believe that if criminology truly aspires to be an inter-disciplinary subject matter 
then the neglect of evolutionary theory can no longer be sustained. 
EVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 
Evolutionary explanations have a long, albeit controversial, history in the social and 
behavioral sciences (see Degler, 1991; Plotkin, 2004). Darwin (1859, 1871) clearly 
recognized that the principles of natural and sexual selection could be just as effectively 
employed to explain the characteristics of humans as they could other animals.  In the 
1970s, the emergence of sociobiology placed these insights within the framework of the 
Neo-Darwinian synthesis with one of its chief advocates, E. O. Wilson (1975, p. 4), 
claiming that sociobiology would “unify the natural and social sciences under the 
conceptual umbrella of evolutionary theory”. The enormous controversy surrounding Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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sociobiology (see Segerstrale, 2000 for an insightful history) effectively distanced 
evolutionary minded social and behavioral scientists from using this particular label; 
however, since the 1980s there have been three main theoretical approaches for 
applying evolutionary theory to an understanding of human behavior: human behavioral 
ecology, evolutionary psychology, and gene-culture co-evolutionary theory (Gangestad & 
Simpson, 2007; Winterhalder & Smith, 2000). Although, as we note below, there are 
some important differences in these three approaches they are united in their agreement 
that the subject matter of the social and behavioral sciences can be fruitfully analyzed 
from an evolutionary perspective. 
  Human behavioral ecologists, who typically focus their studies on hunter-gatherer 
populations or small-scale societies, assume that the hallmark of human behavior is its 
remarkable flexibility and that humans have the evolved capacity to adaptively adjust 
their behavior to different cultural and ecological contexts (Winterhalder & Smith, 2000). 
Evolutionary psychologists also accept that humans demonstrate considerable 
phenotypic plasticity and that both social and ecological environments play an important 
role in the genesis of behavior. However, whereas human behavioral ecologists tend to 
focus on behavior as the main unit of analysis, evolutionary psychologists direct their 
attention to the evolved psychological mechanisms that underpin behavior. In short, 
evolutionary psychologists assume that humans have a large number of specialized 
psychological mechanisms, or modules that have evolved to solve adaptive problems in 
our ancestral past (see Buss, 2008; Confer, Easton, Fleishmann, Goetx, Lewis, Perilloux 
& Buss, 2010). The third main approach for studying human behavior within an 
evolutionary context is known as gene-culture co-evolutionary theory (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2007: Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Central to this perspective is the view that 
culture has played a crucial role in the evolution of our species. It is assumed that the 
capacity for culture is an evolutionary adaptation that has been selected for in our 
ancestral past. However, once in place, the capacity for cultural learning opens up  the 
opportunity for cultural evolution to occur as specific beliefs, values, ideas and practices Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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are retained and transmitted (non-genetically) to subsequent generations. Cultural 
practices, it is assumed, are influenced by evolved psychological predispositions but they 
can, in turn, provide selection pressures that may change gene frequencies and thus 
influence human genetic evolution. The classic example of this is the evolution of lactose 
tolerance which is viewed as  a genetic response to a cultural history of dairy farming 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). A recent variant of this approach, known as niche 
construction theory, suggests an additional system of inheritance as animals (especially 
humans) also transmit niches or constructed environments to subsequent generations 
that can then, in turn, shape genetic and cultural evolution (Laland, Odling-Smee, & 
Myles, 2010). 
  Our discussion of the different evolutionary approaches to understanding human 
behavior has been necessarily brief (see Brown et al., 2011; Durrant & Ward, 2011; 
Ward & Durrant, 2011 for more details); however, three main assumptions can be 
identified that might form the basis for evolutionary behavioral science. The first 
assumption is simply the recognition that humans are one species of primate whose 
physical and psychological characteristics have evolved through the processes of natural 
and sexual selection. Thus, these characteristics can be understood in light of our 
evolutionary history and can be placed in the broader comparative context of primate, 
mammalian, and animal evolution. Second, it is assumed that humans possess a number 
of both domain general and domain specific psychological mechanisms that allow us to 
talk sensibly about an evolved human nature, while recognizing the tremendous capacity 
for behavioral flexibility that generates significant human diversity. Third, the human 
capacities for language, cultural learning, cumulative cultural evolution and niche 
construction must be accepted as essential components of our evolutionary history that 
significantly affects evolutionary processes and, ultimately, human behavior. Not all 
evolutionary minded social scientist will necessarily agree with these assumptions 
(especially the third one) (see Brown et al., 2011 for a discussion), but we believe that 
they are consistent with the core features of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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incorporate recent theoretical developments that have expanded the scope of 
evolutionary processes (e.g., see Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). We also  acknowledge that 
many social scientists remain skeptical of the scientific value of evolutionary 
explanations for human behavior in general and there is a laundry list of standard 
criticisms that include the idea that evolutionary accounts are untestable, unfalisifiable, 
genetically deterministic, reductionistic, and ideologically unsound. However, we think 
that, while recognizing the complexity of applying evolutionary theory to human 
behavior, these criticisms generate more light than heat and they have been adequately 
addressed in a range of recent publications (see Confer et al., 2010; Durrant & Haig, 
2001; Durrant & Ward, 2011; Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). Indeed, we argue that they key 
question is not whether evolutionary theory is relevant to an understanding of human 
behavior, but exactly what place or role they  have to play within the social and 
behavioral sciences.  
 
EVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 
 
Levels of analysis 
A useful starting point for considering the role of evolutionary explanations in 
criminology is Tinbergen’s (1963) influential account of the different types of explanation 
provided by biologists when accounting for the specific characteristics of organisms. 
Tinbergen noted four different, but compatible types of explanation that are typically 
provided. First, biologists provide explanations in terms of the evolutionary function of 
the trait in question. In short, they ask how the characteristic of interest promoted 
survival or reproductive success and thus was favored by natural selection relative to 
less advantageous characteristics. The second type of question concerns the 
evolutionary history (or phylogeny) of the characteristic: how has the trait in question 
evolved over time from earlier forms? The third type of question is directed at the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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ontogeny of the trait or characteristic. In other words, how does the trait develop during 
the lifetime of the organism? Finally, biologists are interested in unraveling the important 
proximate mechanisms (whether physiological, psychological, or social) that underlie the 
characteristic of interest. In sum, if we are to have a complete understanding of a given 
characteristic or trait, Tinbergen (1963) argued that we need to address all four types of 
explanation.  
Although this framework provides a useful way of distinguishing between different 
types of explanation, it needs to be fleshed out a little in order to be of more use for 
social scientists. Of particular relevance is the greater importance of social and cultural 
processes in explaining human behavior. Although social learning is important in other 
species, and various cultural traditions have been identified in other animals (e.g., 
Whiten & van Schaik, 2007) arguably the human capacity for cumulative culture 
evolution is unparalleled (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Cultural learning and the products of 
cultural evolution (from specific values, norms and beliefs through to such inventions as 
writing, agriculture, and the internet), therefore, play a more central explanatory role in 
the human social and behavioral sciences. Culture can be conceptualized as an important 
proximate explanation for human behavior as well as an important input into 
developmental processes. We also suggest that“cultural-historical” explanations can be 
viewed as an important type of distal explanation in the social and behavioral sciences. 
Although the similarities between cultural evolution and biological evolution remain a 
matter of dispute (see Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006 and commentaries) it is clear 
that just as humans have an evolutionary history, so too do human social groups have 
cultural histories that provide important inputs into developmental and proximate 
processes.  
Tinbergen’s framework speaks to the different types of explanation that are 
offered for different characteristics, but we also need to  acknowledgetwo other 
important types of relationship between explanations in the social (and natural) sciences. 
The first concerns what can be termed “part-whole” relations. The natural sciences are Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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predicated on a hierarchical view of nature in which lower order systems are embedded 
in higher order systems. Thus, for biological systems, cells are parts of organs which 
reside in organisms that are embedded in social groups that can be located in specific 
ecological contexts. For social scientists, psychological processes are parts of individuals 
who reside in social groups embedded in communities or neighborhoods that are part of 
the wider society. Criminologists are well versed in this distinction and much integrative 
theoretical work in criminology concerns the linking of macro-level (typically 
communities and societies) with micro-level (typically individuals and social groups) 
explanations (e.g., Muftić, 2009). The second type of relationship that we need to r 
appreciateis one that is referred to as “supervenience” and which most obviously 
accounts for the relationship between mental processes and their physical instantiation 
in the brain (Sterelny, 1990). For instance, the capacity for self-control or self-regulation 
relies on important set of processes that can be described in psychological terms (e.g., 
impulse control, delay of gratification) but also supervene on well studied neural systems 
that reside in the pre-frontal cortex (Ratchford & Beaver, 2009 ). The psychological and 
physical accounts here provide (with some qualifications) different ways of describing the 
same processes. In Table 1 a framework for understanding these different types of 
explanation is provided, arrayed from more distal (e.g., evolutionary) to more proximate 
(e.g., psychological and social processes) explanations, with examples drawn from 
criminological theory (see also McGuire, 2004, p. 31 for the different “levels of 
description” in criminological theory). 
As Barkow (2006) has argued, the concept of “vertical integration” can assist us 
in understanding how explanations at different levels of analysis may relate to each 
other. Explanations drawn from different levels of analysis are not typically in direct 
competition with each because they typically provide alternative, but compatible 
accounts of the phenomena of interest. It makes no sense, for instance, to say that a 
theory that focuses on proximate neurobiological underpinnings of self-control is better 
than an a approach which focuses on developmental factors or evolutionary history, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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although explanations at a given level of analysis may be more salient for addressing 
specific research questions (see Durrant & Ward, 2011). It is important, however, that 
explanations drawn from different levels of analysis are conceptually compatible or 
consistent with each other. Therefore, in general terms, we should expect evolutionary 
approaches in criminology to complement and enrich non-evolutionary explanations 
rather than replace them. 
In order to provide a clearer understanding of the role of evolutionary 
explanations in criminology it is useful to consider the main strands in criminological 
theorizing and their possible relationships to evolutionary explanations. In the following 
section we examine relevant linkages with arguably the three most important theoretical 
“traditions” in criminology: anomie/strain theories, control theories, and social 
learning/developmental perspectives. Our account of these three criminological 
perspectives and their relation to evolutionary approaches is necessarily limited and we 
simply highlight possible points of connection that can be more thoroughly explored in 
subsequent research. We also appreciate that these three perspectives hardly exhaust 
the repertoire of criminological theory and there is substantial scope to offer linkages 
between evolutionary theory and other perspectives. 
Strain theories 
One of the fundamental underlying premises of the various forms of strain theory is the 
idea that adherence to social norms that preclude criminal and antisocial behavior can be 
taken for granted and thus it is norm violations in the form of criminal offending that 
needs to be explained. For classic strain theorists, such as Merton (1938) and Cohen 
(1955), it is the failure to achieve monetary success and social status that ultimately 
leads to crime as offenders seek culturally valued goals through illegitimate means. More 
recently, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) have emphasized the particular nature of 
American culture that elevates the importance of monetary success, and thus creates 
incentives for crime in individuals who are – for social-structural reasons – “locked out” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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of this American dream. Although clearly strains impact on individuals, classic strain 
theory can be best viewed as a “macro-level” theoretical perspective that focuses on the 
role of social-structural (society level) and cultural-historical (i.e., American cultural 
values) factors. Agnew’s (2005, 2006) general strain theory also incorporates macro-
level factors but significantly broadens the scope of strains that might lead to crime and, 
importantly, pays particular attention to the psychological impact of strains and their 
particular developmental contexts, thus integrating macro and micro level variables. 
There is now an extensive empirical and theoretical literature on strain theory, and our 
discussion has clearly brushed over some important nuances, but essentially what unites 
various forms of strain theory is the idea that individuals may respond to a failure to 
achieve legitimate and valued goals through criminal and antisocial behavior. 
  The notion of social status provides a good starting place for understanding points 
of connection between strain theory and evolutionary approaches to crime and antisocial 
behavior. As Walsh (2009a, p. 136) notes, “Anomie/strain theory shares its deep interest 
in status striving with evolutionary psychology and views status concerns as fundamental 
motivating factors behind much of human behavior, both deviant and conforming”. For 
evolutionary psychologists, as Walsh (2009a) points out, the motivations underlying 
status striving can be understood in terms of their evolutionary function. A large body of 
literature has, for instance, demonstrated that in most social species status or social 
rank is positively correlated with reproductive success (Barkow, 1989; Ellis, 1995). The 
same outcome also appears to hold in human populations (Barkow, 1989; Hopcroft, 
2006). The importance of status striving, however, differs for males and females in 
predictable ways. Because of fundamental differences in parental investment, males of 
most mammalian species can increase their reproductive success through sexual access 
to multiple females; the reproductive success of females, however, is more closely tied 
to their capacity to raise viable offspring. Thus, so the argument goes, although social 
status is still important for females, there has been stronger selection on status striving 
in males because they can increase their reproductive success by obtaining higher status Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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and dominance over other males (Buss, 2008; Puts, 2010). It follows that males who are 
thwarted (for whatever reason) from obtaining social status may be particularly 
motivated to engage in criminal behavior if that is the only route available to them. We 
may also expect that young males are particularly motivated to seek status as 
competition between men is heightened during late adolescence and early adulthood 
(Daly & Wilson, 1988; Puts, 2010).   This evolutionary account provides a plausible distal 
explanation (in terms of evolutionary function and history) for the criminological 
phenomenon that is of particular interest to strain theorists: the high rates of offending 
among socially (and financially) disadvantaged young men. 
  The picture is, however, somewhat more complex than this. Importantly, status 
in human societies can be cashed out in different ways. Consistent with classic strain 
theories and the recent work of Messner and Rosenfeld (2007), particular cultural norms 
and values may translate  what counts as social status in particular social environments 
and cultural-historical contexts. Indeed, as Henrich and Gil-White (2001) argue, 
although status in humans is partly related to social dominance, consistent with most 
mammalian species, it is also linked with the prestige that can be obtained through the 
development of particular skills or expertise (see also Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010). 
This more inclusive evolutionary conception of status provides interesting points of 
connection with the criminological literature that highlights how, for some individuals, 
criminal offending may provide opportunities for autonomy, respect, (e.g., Bourgois, 
1995) and a sense of mastery in the display of criminal expertise (Ward & Maruna, 
2007). In other words, fundamental motivations underlying status may, in particular 
social and cultural environments that provide limited opportunities for legitimate outlets, 
result in increased risk for offending as offenders seek universal human goals through 
means that society deems to be inappropriate (i.e., criminal offending).  
 
Control theories Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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Control theories form a second important traditional approach in theoretical criminology. 
Conventionally, two main forms of control dominate the theoretical literature: social 
control and self-control. For social control theorists, crime and antisocial behavior 
become more likely when “an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken” (Hirschi, 
1969, p. 16). Thus individuals who internalize pro-social norms and values and who form 
strong and enduring attachments to others are less likely to engage in criminal offending. 
Sampson’s (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997) notion of “collective efficacy” places 
the importance of social bonds within a broader community context by noting that 
communities which demonstrate high levels of social cohesion and  willingness to enforce 
social norms experience lower levels of crime and antisocial behavior. Within a 
developmental context, Sampson and Laub (2005) also highlight the importance of social 
bonds and how they can explain patterns of offending over particular life-history 
trajectories. For self-control theorists the important source of control can be found not 
with an individual’s social bonds, but within the individual themselves and their capacity 
to regulate or control their behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). For Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) this capacity for self-control lies at the heart of criminal offending: 
individuals who are better able to control the temptations afforded by criminal 
opportunities are simply less likely to offend. Recent formulations of self-control theory 
also provide linkages with social control theories by highlighting how the capacity for 
self-control is partly determined by the relative costs of offending which are in turn 
influenced by individuals’ social bonds with others (Gottfredson, 2011; Hirschi, 2004). 
Control theories are best viewed as proximate explanations for offending, although they 
also include important developmental components. Self-control theories focus on the 
psychological level of analysis while social-control theories typically focus on the role of 
immediate social groups (e.g., the family), neighborhood or community factors, and the 
wider society. 
  From an evolutionary perspective, all organisms are motivated to pursue 
reproductively relevant resources such as food and mates and there is good evidence to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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suggest that the neurobiological underpinnings of reward-seeking behavior are relatively 
similar across a wide variety of species (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008). However, 
organisms also need to regulate the pursuit of rewards with reference to  specific 
environmental contexts. The desire to assuage hunger, for instance, needs to be 
restrained if a predator is present and the pursuit of sexually receptive females may 
need to be  checked in the presence of socially dominant conspecifics (i.e., other males). 
Although the capacity for self-control, broadly construed, is common among different 
animal species, it may be especially important for humans (Eastwick, 2009). Because 
humans are a long-lived, highly social species that relies heavily on culture (Baumeister, 
2005) and has the ability to consider a diverse range of relevant goals (including 
abstract and symbolic ones) even though they may be located far into the future (Leary 
& Buttermore, 2003), the capacity for effortful self-regulation may be especially 
important. In short, the capacity for self-control or self-regulation can be considered an 
evolutionary adaptation, perhaps emerging in its modern form as recently as 40,000 to 
50,000 years ago (Eastwick, 2009). It is not surprising from this perspective that self-
control is one of the more important proximate predictor of crime and antisocial behavior 
as it has evolved, in part, to regulate those behaviors that, although strongly motivated, 
also can result in adverse future consequences including the risk of social sanctions. 
Consistent with sex differences in parental investment, discussed above, we should also 
expect important gender differences to emerge in the capacity for self-regulation as, on 
average, men have more to gain in reproductive terms from the pursuit of immediate 
rewards. A recent meta-analysis of gender differences in impulsivity suggests that, 
consistent with this view, males demonstrate greater reward-seeking, less capacity for 
effortful control, and less sensitivity to punishment (Cross, Copping and Campbell, 2011). 
Within the context of human evolution, the relationship between self-control and social 
control are also important. If one of the important functions of self-control is to regulate 
behavior in a way that conforms to local norms and values we should expect that 
attachment to pro-social institutions and environments in which social norms are more 
robustly enforced (i.e. those the demonstrate high rates of collective efficacy) should Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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result in greater capacity for self-regulation and therefore less antisocial and criminal 
behavior. 
Criminologists typically  appreciatethat there is a fundamental tension between 
strain and control theories of criminal offending. The former assumes that crime and 
antisocial behavior are departures from “normal” behavior brought on by various strains; 
the latter are predicated on the idea that humans are “naturally” selfish and thus it is the 
avoidance of crime and antisocial behavior that need to be explained (in terms of various 
forms of self and social control). An evolutionary perspective provides a potential 
rapprochement to these two, seemingly opposing, viewpoints: survival and reproductive 
success in humans as a long-lived, highly social, pair-bonding (yet polygnous) species 
whose offspring are profoundly dependent has favored a complex suite of motivations 
and self-regulatory mechanisms that manifest as both the selfish striving for 
reproductively relevant resources and the need for self-constraint and adherence to 
group norms. To put this point crudely, criminal behavior is both normal and to be 
expected (as control theorists would argue), but so, too, is the disinclination to engage 
in norm violating behavior. Understanding how  these various factors play out depends 
on a range of factors including the particular developmental context that individuals find 
themselves in. 
 
Social learning and developmental theories 
Broadly construed, the social learning tradition has a long history in criminology, 
exemplified by Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory and Akers (1995) 
Social learning Theory. In the last few decades one of the most prominent trends in 
criminological theory has been the rise in importance of developmental theories of crime 
that build on, but substantially expand, the work of Sutherland, Akers and others. One 
important feature of recent developmental theories is their attempt to broaden the range 
of relevant variables to include biological, psychological, social, and cultural factors (e.g., Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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Agnew, 2006; Farrington, 2010; Moffitt, 1993). Space precludes anything like a 
thorough review of these approaches, but some of the important key elements can be 
readily teased out (see Farrington, 2010). First, it is  acceptedthat there is a 
considerable degree of continuity in antisocial behavior from childhood to adulthood that 
can be linked to a reasonably well identified set of biological, psychological and social 
risk factors that include genetic factors, prenatal experiences, adverse family 
environments, peer relations, and community contexts. Second, a relatively small group 
of individuals are responsible for a disproportionate amount of serious criminal offences. 
Third, antisocial and criminal behavior becomes significantly more prevalent during 
adolescence, but then declines during adulthood, generating the age-crime curve familiar 
to criminologists. Fourth, antisocial and risk-taking behavior during adolescence tends to 
be generalized in nature and involves a diverse range of activities including drug use, 
heavy drinking, risky sexual behavior, reckless driving, property offending, auto-theft 
and violence. And, finally, desistance from offending is often related to important life-
events such as getting married, having children, or obtaining stable employment. 
  Developmental criminologists have provided wide-ranging, theoretically 
integrated explanations for these various findings as illustrated in the models offered by 
Farrington (2010), Moffitt (1993) and Sampson and Laub (2005). These findings can also 
be understood within the evolutionary context of human development. Broadly speaking, 
we can view the human life cycle, from birth to death, as the product of evolution by 
natural selection (Stearns, Allal & Mace, 2008). Because developing organisms face 
different adaptive challenges at different stages of their life history we should, therefore, 
expect that the proximate mechanisms that underpin human behavior to be calibrated to 
specific developmental contexts. Considerable advances have been made in recent years 
concerning the physiological, psychological and social processes underlying adolescent 
risk-taking and antisocial behavior. Recent studies, for instance, have demonstrated that 
young people can accurately appraise the risk of certain behaviors (Reyna & Farley, 
2006), however they may be more attracted to risk and rewarding behaviors as Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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indicated by heightened activity in the neural mechanisms underlying reward (Casey, 
Getz & Galvan, 2008). They also appear to be less able to effectively regulate behavior 
in part due to the incomplete maturation of brain areas underling impulse control 
(Steinberg, 2007). Risky behavior in adolescence also tends to be heightened by the 
presence of peers (e.g., Gardner and Steinberg, 2005 ) and offending is more likely to 
occur in groups. From an evolutionary perspective these proximate processes are not 
arbitrary or accidental features of development but, plausibly, reflect the selection for 
risk-taking and intra-sexual competition during a crucial period of development in which 
dominance hierarchies are being established and competition over mates and mating is 
heightened (Walsh, 2009b).  
  Although the prevalence of offending peaks during adolescence there are also key 
individual differences in the nature and extent of antisocial behavior and its persistence 
during adulthood.  From a life-history perspective these differences may reflect, and at 
an evolutionary level of analysis, alternative reproductive strategies that arise due to 
different developmental experiences. In short, life-history theory is an evolutionary 
perspective that explores how organisms allocate resources to different domains 
depending on their evolutionary history and their particular developmental context 
(Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). Important trade-offs include the allocation of energy into 
current versus future reproduction and investment into mating versus parenting effort. 
As a species, humans are characterized by delayed reproduction and the investment of 
significant parenting resources into a relatively small number of offspring. However, the 
relative value (in evolutionary terms) of the different trade-offs identified by life-history 
theory depends on specific environmental contexts. For instance, early developmental 
experiences characterized by parental conflict, stress, economic deprivation, and harsh 
and inconsistent parenting may provide key cues that indicate that the environment is 
inherently risky and unpredictable thus propelling individuals along a life-history 
trajectory that favors early reproduction and the allocation of resources into mating 
rather than parenting effort (Belsky, 2010; Mishra & Lalumiere, 2008). These individuals Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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may be particularly prone to engage in antisocial and criminal behavior as they tend to 
be more impulsive and present-oriented. From an evolutionary perspective, then, what 
Moffitt (1993) has termed “life-course persistent offenders” may reflect the unfolding of 
an environmentally contingent adaptive life-history strategy. Although plausible, this 
evolutionary life-history approach linking childhood experiences with reproductive 
strategies is currently best validated from studies of girls (Belsky, 2010) and recent work 
has provided a more nuanced analysis of how early environmental experiences may 
affect adaptive developmental trajectories suggesting the need for further research 
before this hypothesis can be uncritically accepted (e.g., see Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach 
& Schlomer, 2009).  
 
APPLYING EVOLUTIONARY BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 
Now that we have considered how evolutionary approaches may be related to some of 
the key mainstream theoretical perspectives in criminology, we consider how an 
evolutionary approach can inform our understanding of the nature of punishment 
responses. 
Punishment 
The ubiquitous human motivation to punish norm violators has prompted a number of 
scholars to argue that a sense of justice, including the imposition of negative sanctions, 
has been selected for in our evolutionary history (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles & Richerson, 
2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Hauser, 2006; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Walsh, 2000). 
Walsh (2000, p. 842), for example, suggests that “the human sense of justice is an 
adaptation in the strictest meaning of the term: that is, an evolved solution to the 
problems faced by our distant ancestors”. There is a general consensus that the primary 
evolutionary function of sanctioning norm violators is to promote within group 
cooperation. In other words, the mechanisms underlying the motivation to punish Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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evolved to solve the “problem of cooperation” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Boyd et al., 
2003).  
The existence of widespread cooperation among non-kin (what Richerson and 
Boyd, 2005 term human “ultrasociality”) is an evolutionary conundrum: why would 
individuals incur costs to themselves by cooperating and therefore benefiting other, 
unrelated, group members? Individuals who receive the benefits of cooperation without 
incurring the costs of cooperating will be at a selective advantage and thus cooperating 
types should be eliminated from the population.  The existence of, what is termed 
“altruistic punishment” (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003), or “moralistic 
punishment” (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) is proposed as a solution to this problem: if 
enough individuals within a group are motivated to punish those that free ride on the 
cooperation of others, then non-cooperative individuals will be at an evolutionary 
disadvantage compared to those who do cooperate (and thus do not attract negative 
sanctions), and widespread cooperation can be sustained.  
Consistent with these theoretical ideas, research using experimental public goods 
games has consistently found that: (1) individuals are strongly motivated to punish 
those that act in an “unfair” fashion even at a cost to themselves; (2) uninvolved third 
parties are, likewise, motivated to punish non-cooperators; (3) the amount of 
cooperation is significantly increased when non-cooperators can be and are punished 
(Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006); and (4) groups in which sanctioning occurs 
will, ultimately, attract more members and demonstrate higher overall levels of 
cooperation than groups that do not involve sanctioning (Gurerk, Irlenbusch & 
Rockenbach, 2006). In sum, there is consistent evidence for the existence of, what 
Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr (2008, p. 243) term “strong reciprocity”: “ a 
propensity, in the context of a shared task, to cooperate with others similarly disposed, 
even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative norms, 
even when punishing is personally costly”.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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Punishment may effectively solve the problem of cooperation, but it also creates 
a “second-order” cooperation problem. Individuals who are motivated to punish will incur 
some costs of punishing and therefore individuals who do not punish will be at a relative 
selective advantage. There are several possible solutions to this problem. Barclay (2006) 
has argued that the costs of punishment are offset as individuals who are willing to 
punish garner reputational benefits for punishing (they are deemed more trustworthy by 
group members) that translate into fitness (i.e., survival and reproductive) benefits. 
Others have argued that the actual costs of punishing may not be especially significant. 
This would be the case in groups where punishers are common (and norm violators rare) 
because individuals would only be required to punish rarely (Boyd et al., 2003; 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Boyd et al. (2003) argue that altruistic punishment has 
evolved via group selectionist processes. In short, cooperative groups are more 
successful than non-cooperative groups, therefore increasing the frequency of 
cooperation. Because groups that contain more individuals who are motivated to punish 
are more cooperative (by reducing the number of non-cooperators), the frequency of 
punishers will also increase. In groups containing a large number of cooperators and 
punishers, the costs of punishment will be significantly diminished (especially if 
punishment also attracts other benefits as Barclay, 2006 suggests). For group selection 
to work there must be relatively stable variation among cultural groups (Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005). Group differences are maintained via conformist social learning (individuals 
learn the typical beliefs, values, norms, and practices of their group), and the 
punishment of norm violators. Although group selectionist accounts are viewed with 
skepticism by some there is good reason to believe that group selection is not only a 
viable evolutionary mechanism, but has also played an important role in the evolution of 
our lineage (Wilson & Wilson, 2007). 
This brief outline of an evolutionary theory of punishment helps us to address the 
fundamental question of why humans are motivated to punish. Punishment exists 
because the mechanisms underlying punishment responses are evolutionary adaptations Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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that have been selected for because they historically conferred fitness benefits on 
individuals who possessed them by promoting cooperation within groups. However, 
although evolutionary accounts have often focused on the promotion of cooperation and 
the punishment of free riders, it is clear that scope of punishable acts in human societies 
is much broader than this. Successful groups are not simply those that have high levels 
of cooperation per se, but are also highly socially cohesive, relative to out-groups: 
individuals behave in ways that favor the in-group, adhere to group-held norms, rules 
and practices, and are willing in some contexts to place the interests of the group above 
those of the self or kin. The motivation to punish, then, can be viewed more broadly as 
an evolutionary adaptation (or suite of adaptations) that evolved because it increased 
within group cooperation and group cohesion and thus contributed to the fitness of in-
groups (and, thus, in-group members) relative to out-groups. 
From this perspective we should expect that some acts, such as harm to in-group 
members, theft, and cheating should be relatively universally punished across groups 
because they will reliably undermine the effective functioning of groups (Robinson & 
Kurzban, 2007).  However, acts that are perceived to pose a threat to social 
cohesion/social flourishing also tend to be punished even if they result in no clear and 
obvious harm to others. Because punishable acts are simply those that violate certain 
social norms, a large and diverse range of human behaviors may become subject to 
sanctions. As Haidt (2007) has argued, what constitutes the human moral domain (and 
thus the scope of punishable acts) extends beyond the liberal Western notions of harm 
and justice to embrace a wide range of acts that threaten group cohesion and the 
effective functioning of moral communities. We should, therefore, expect the specific 
nature of punishable acts to vary among cultures, as through the process of cultural 
evolution different groups develop distinct collections of values, norms, beliefs and 
practices. An evolutionary perspective can thus help us to understand both similarities 
and differences in punishable acts in different cultural-historical contexts. However, what 
counts as a punishable act, and how given acts will be punished, depends on specific Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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social and cultural-historical contexts, highlighting the importance of evolutionary models 
that allows for the co-evolution of genes and culture, and providing points of 
interconnection with more mainstream sociological approaches to understanding 
punishment.  
  For example, a considerable body of literature is now devoted to explaining cross-
national and historical differences in punishment, with a focus on understanding 
differences in punitiveness (see Tonry, 2007; Whitman, 2005 for reviews). No consensus 
has emerged on what the most important factors are. However, one prominent line of 
research has examined the role of society level characteristics such as political economy 
(e.g., Cavadino & Dignan, 2006), political systems that promote “penal populism” (e.g, 
Pratt & Clark, 2005), and racial heterogeneity (Ruddell & Urbina, 2004). Another 
direction of inquiry has focused on particular patterns of norms and values, often in 
combination with social-structural characteristics, and how they translate into different 
penal responses to criminal offending (Tonry, 2009). Norbert Elias’s (1939) conception of 
a civilizing process, for instance, provides an account of how changing norms within 
European culture since the Middle Ages contributed to a decline in brutal, and public 
forms of punishment (see also, Pratt, 2000; Vaughan, 2000). There are also important 
linkages that can be made between evolutionary accounts and proximate psychological 
and physiological approaches to understanding punishment responses. For instance, 
psychological accounts of punishment highlight how norm violations invoke a set of 
cognitive and affective responses (instantiated in the brain) that ultimately result in the 
motivation to punish the individual who has committed the norm violation (see Darley, 
2009; Seymour, Singer & Dolan, 2007). Plausibly these reflect the operation of evolved 
adaptations for punishment that have been selected for during the course of our 
evolutionary history. 
Clearly a complete account of punishment requires an understanding of both the 
seemingly universal motivation to punish in terms of its evolutionary function, the 
proximate physiological, psychological and social mechanisms that give rise to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Evolution & Crime 
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punishment and the social-structural and cultural-historical processes that shape the 
form and nature of punishment responses. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
motivation to punish is linked to perceptions of fairness, and in this respect, is innate. 
However, the specific content of norms associated with fairness, and those that spell out 
the nature of punishment and its severity, and duration, are culturally derived. This is 
not a problem for a behavioral evolutionary approach such as gene-culture co-evolution 
theory, where there is a stress on the important causal role of social/cultural processes 
in the generation of human behavior.   
CONCLUSION 
In their influential book, A General Theory of Crime, Gottfredson & Hirshi (1990, p. 275) 
noted that “the study of crime is too important to be diverted by arguments about 
theory ownership or discipline boundaries” and the need for criminology to be a truly 
interdisciplinary endeavor is widely recognized. However, despite the increasingly 
inclusionary nature of criminological theory and the more prominent role afforded 
psychological and biological factors in general, criminologists should not neglect the fact 
that humans are evolved organisms and hence an understanding of our evolutionary 
history has important implications for theory construction in criminology. We suggest 
that the growing literature in evolutionary forensic psychology, and recent developments 
in the application of evolutionary theory to human behavior, provide a valuable 
opportunity for criminologists to broaden their theoretical horizons and more fully 
consider how evolutionary approaches may contribute to their discipline.  
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Table 1 
Levels of explanation and theoretical approaches in criminology  
Level of explanation  Explanatory focus  Examples of criminological theory 
Distal Explanations 
Evolutionary 
explanations 
 
Evolutionary history and function   Homicide adaptation theory (Duntley & Buss, 2011); and other 
evolutionary approaches to violence (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1988) 
Cultural-historical 
explanations 
Cultural history and context  Southern culture of honor (Nisbett, 1993); sub-cultures of 
violence (Anderson, 1999) 
Developmental Explanations 
Developmental 
explanations 
Developmental processes  Integrated cognitive antisocial potential model (Farrington, 
2010); social learning theory (Akers, 1985); Dual developmental 
pathway model (Moffit, 1993) 
Proximate explanations 
Psychological 
explanations  
Personality characteristics, affective 
states and cognitive processing 
Self-control theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) 
Physiological 
explanations  
Physiological processes   The “frontal brain hypothesis” (Raine, Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 
1997); and other neuropsychological models of self-control  
Social explanations  The role of peer, family and school 
influences 
Differential association theory, sub-cultural theories of 
delinquency 
Community 
explanations 
The role of neighbourhood and 
community factors 
Social control theory (Hirschi, 1969), collective efficacy 
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Society level 
explanations 
The role of societal level social-
structural factors 
Strain theory (Merton, 1938; Agnew, 2005) 
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